

# Experimental extraction of secure correlations from a noisy private state



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
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# Entangled states




$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\nearrow\nwarrow\rangle + |\nwarrow\nwarrow\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\updownupdown\rangle + |\leftrightarrowleftrightarrow\rangle)$$

$$|\nearrow\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\leftrightarrow\rangle + |\updown\rangle)$$

$$|\nwarrow\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\leftrightarrow\rangle - |\updown\rangle)$$

There is no equivalent model in which photons had fixed polarization states before our measurements (Bell inequalities)

# Secure key thanks to entanglement



If A and B make sure that their state is of the form

$$|\phi_+\rangle_{AB} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\leftrightarrowleftrightarrow\rangle + |\uparrow\uparrow\rangle)$$

then


$$|\Phi\rangle_{ABE} = |\phi_+\rangle_{AB} \otimes |\varphi\rangle_E$$

E has no information on their measurement results

$$|0\rangle := |\leftrightarrow\rangle \quad |1\rangle := |\uparrow\rangle$$

A and B share one secret bit

# Noisy entanglement



Statistical mixture

$$\rho_{AB} = \frac{1}{2}|\phi_{+}\rangle\langle\phi_{+}| + \frac{1}{2}|\phi_{-}\rangle\langle\phi_{-}| = \frac{1}{2}|00\rangle\langle 00| + \frac{1}{2}|11\rangle\langle 11|$$

Correlations are no longer secure

$$|\Phi\rangle_{ABE} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|000\rangle + |111\rangle)$$


$$\rho_{AB} = \text{Tr}_E(|\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|)$$

$$|\phi_{+}\rangle\langle\phi_{+}| = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{1} & \cdot & \cdot & \boxed{1} \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \boxed{1} & \cdot & \cdot & \boxed{1} \end{pmatrix} \longrightarrow \rho_{AB} = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} \boxed{1} & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \boxed{1} \end{pmatrix}$$

Security Correlations


# Entanglement distillation

Usually we deal with noisy entangled states




# Entanglement distillation

Usually we deal with noisy entangled states



# Entanglement distillation



**Distillable entanglement**

$$E_D = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \left( \frac{M(N)}{N} \right)$$

**Secure key length**

$$K \geq E_D$$


$$K \not\geq E_D?$$

**Key distillation  $\neq$  Entanglement distillation**

e.g. There exist bound entangled states ( $E_D=0$ ) with  $K>0$



# 4 qubit state with $K = E_D$



$$\rho_{ABA'B'} = \frac{1}{2} (|\phi_+\rangle\langle\phi_+| \otimes |00\rangle\langle 00| + |\phi_-\rangle\langle\phi_-| \otimes |11\rangle\langle 11|)$$

Local measurement on  $A'$ ,  $B'$  distinguishes between two entangled states in  $A$  and  $B$

$$\rho_{ABA'B'} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \begin{array}{cc} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & 1 \end{array} & \dots & \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & -1 \end{array} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & -1 \end{array} & \dots & \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & \\ \dots & \dots & 1 \end{array} \end{array} \right)$$


Security Correlations

$$E_D = 1$$

$$\frac{1}{4} \left\| \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & -1 \\ \dots & \dots & -1 & \dots \end{array} \right\|_1 = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$K = 1$$

# 4 qubit state with $K > E_D$




$$\rho_{ABA'B'} = \frac{1}{4} (|\phi_+\rangle\langle\phi_+| \otimes P_+ + |\phi_-\rangle\langle\phi_-| \otimes |\psi_-\rangle\langle\psi_-|)$$

$$|\phi_{\pm}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle) \quad |\psi_{\pm}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle) \quad P_+ = |\phi_+\rangle\langle\phi_+| + |\phi_-\rangle\langle\phi_-| + |\psi_+\rangle\langle\psi_+|$$

No local measurement distinguishing between  $P_+$  and  $|\psi_-\rangle\langle\psi_-|$

$$E_D < 1 \quad E_D \leq \log_2 \text{Tr}|\rho^{T_{BB'}}| \approx 0.585$$

# 4 qubit state with $K > E_D$



$$\rho_{ABA'B'} = \frac{1}{4} (|\phi_+\rangle\langle\phi_+| \otimes P_+ + |\phi_-\rangle\langle\phi_-| \otimes |\psi_-\rangle\langle\psi_-|)$$

$$|\phi_{\pm}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle) \quad |\psi_{\pm}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle) \quad P_+ = |\phi_+\rangle\langle\phi_+| + |\phi_-\rangle\langle\phi_-| + |\psi_+\rangle\langle\psi_+|$$

$$\rho_{ABA'B'} = \frac{1}{8} \left( \begin{array}{c} \left( \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} \right) \cdots \left( \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} \right) \\ \vdots \\ \left( \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} \right) \cdots \left( \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right)$$

Security

Correlations


$$E_D \leq 0.585$$

$$\frac{1}{8} \left\| \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} \right\| = \frac{1}{2}$$


$$K = 1$$

# Experimental setup

(more in the next talk by K. Dobek...)



4 photon coincidences 2/s



# State reconstruction

**3 x 3 x 3 x 3 = 81 different measurement basis**  $\sigma_i \otimes \sigma_j \otimes \sigma_k \otimes \sigma_l$

**In each basis 16 different coincidence patterns**

**$\sim 5 \cdot 10^5$  events grouped in 81 x 16 = 1296 types**

$$n_{b,m} \quad (b = 1 \dots 81, m = 1 \dots 16) \quad N = \sum_{b,m} n_{b,m} = 5 \cdot 10^5$$

$$\Pi_{b,m} \downarrow p_{b,m} = \text{Tr}(\rho \Pi_{b,m})$$

$$\rho \pm \delta \rho$$

$$K \pm \delta K > E_D \pm \delta E_D$$

**Total uncertainty = state preparation uncertainty + measurement implementation uncertainty + reconstruction uncertainty**

# Max likelihood with positive semi-definiteness condition

$$\rho = T^\dagger T \quad T = \begin{matrix} \blacktriangledown \\ \blacktriangledown \\ \blacktriangledown \end{matrix} \quad t_k \quad k = 1 \dots d^2$$

$$p(i|\rho) = \text{Tr}(\Pi_i \rho) \quad n_i - \text{number of events}$$

$$\mathcal{L} = \prod_i p(i|\rho)^{n_i} - \text{likelihood function}$$

$$\max_T \log \mathcal{L}(T^\dagger T) \quad \Sigma_{ij}^{-1} = \left( \frac{\partial^2}{\partial t_i \partial t_j} \mathcal{L} \right)$$

**Pros:** - positive semi-definiteness guaranteed

**Cons:** - unpractical for large number of qubits (>6)  
- uncertainty may be underestimated for small samples  
- for small samples tendency to return purer states

# Bayesian approach

$p(\rho)$  - apriori distribution       $p(i|\rho) = \text{Tr}(\Pi_i \rho)$

$$p(\rho|\{i_1, \dots, i_N\}) \propto p(\{i_1, \dots, i_N\}|\rho)p(\rho)$$

$$\tilde{\rho} = \int d\rho \rho p(\rho|\{i_1, \dots, i_N\})$$


- Pros:**
- clear statistical interpretation
  - uncertainty of reconstruction appearing naturally
  - no need for numerical optimization
- Cons:**
- difficult numerically due to the need for normalization of a posteriori distribution
  - choice of the apriori distribution

# Bayesian approach + gaussian approximation

$$\rho = \sum_k x_k \sigma_k \quad \sigma_k - \text{hermitian basis} \quad k = 1 \dots d^2$$


a priori distribution  $p(\vec{x}) \propto \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{2} (\vec{x} - \vec{x}_0)^T \Sigma^{-1} (\vec{x} - \vec{x}_0) \right]$

$$p(i|\vec{x}) = \text{Tr}(\rho \Pi_i) = \text{Tr}(\sum_k x_k \sigma_k \Pi_i) = (A\vec{x})_i \quad A_{ik} = \text{Tr} \sigma_k \Pi_i$$



$$p_{\text{Multinomial}(N, \vec{p})}(\vec{n}) = \frac{N!}{n_1! \dots n_m!} p_1^{n_1} \cdot \dots \cdot p_m^{n_m}$$





## Gaussian approximation

$$p(\vec{x}|\vec{n}) \propto \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{2} (A\vec{x} - \langle \vec{p} \rangle)^T \Sigma^{(D)-1} (A\vec{x} - \langle \vec{p} \rangle) \right] \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{2} (\vec{x} - \vec{x}_0)^T \Sigma^{-1} (\vec{x} - \vec{x}_0) \right]$$

## A posteriori mean and covariance matrix


$$\Sigma'^{-1} = A^{-1} \Sigma^{(D)-1} A + \Sigma^{-1} \quad \vec{x}' = A^{-1} \langle \vec{p} \rangle - \Sigma' \Sigma^{-1} (\vec{x}_0 - A^{-1} \langle \vec{p} \rangle)$$

- Pros:**
- easily obtained uncertainties of reconstruction
  - much faster than Max-Likelihood (20s instead of 30min)

- Cons:**
- no guarantee for positive semi-definiteness
  - choice of a priori distribution

# What about positivity?

We need positivity, otherwise we cannot calculate  $E_D$  nor  $K$




$$p_{\text{trunc}}(\rho) = \begin{cases} p_{\text{Bayes}}(\rho), & \rho \geq 0 \\ 0 & \rho < 0 \end{cases}$$

Slice sampling (in  $d^2$  dimensions)

Check whether  $\rho_{\text{ML}}$  is within the e.g. 95% confidence interval

# What about positivity?

We need positivity, otherwise we cannot calculate  $E_D$  nor  $K$




$$p_{\text{trunc}}(\rho) = \begin{cases} p_{\text{Bayes}}(\rho), & \rho \geq 0 \\ 0 & \rho < 0 \end{cases}$$

Slice sampling (in  $d^2$  dimensions)

We get a representative sample of density matrices

Check whether  $\rho_{\text{ML}}$  is within the e.g. 95% confidence interval)


# Reconstruction



$$F = 0.9724(7)$$


$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} & \cdot \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} & \cdot \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \begin{array}{cccc} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{array} \end{array} \right)$$

# Reconstruction



$$F = 0.9724(7)$$

$$\left( \begin{array}{cc} \begin{matrix} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{matrix} & \cdot & \cdot & \begin{matrix} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{matrix} \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \begin{matrix} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{matrix} & \cdot & \cdot & \begin{matrix} 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & 1 & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & 1 \end{matrix} \end{array} \right)$$




$$E_D^{\text{Bayes}} \leq 0.581(4)$$

$$K^{\text{Bayes}} = 0.690(7)$$

$$E_D^{\text{ML}} \leq 0.578(4) \quad K^{\text{ML}} = 0.704(7)$$

# Summary

We have extracted secure cryptographic key from noisy entangled states with low distillable entanglement



K. Dobek, M. Karpiński, RDD, K. Banaszek, P. Horodecki, Phys. Rev. Lett. **106**, 030501 (2011)



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