

# A set of practical observations

about investing,  
speculation  
and how financial  
markets work

**Grzegorz Link**

Opoka TFI S.A.


Faculty of Physics, University of Warsaw

JUST A NORMAL DAY AT THE NATION'S MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTION...



**Guess  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the average**


# Guess 2/3 of the average



source: <http://drvinceknight.blogspot.com/2013/04/two-thirds-of-average-game.html>

# Guess 2/3 of the average

PERCENT OF READERS PICKING EACH NUMBER:




source: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/21/upshot/how-readers-fared-in-upshots-number-puzzle.html>

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## Wait But Why Results

(4,940 guesses)

Percent of readers picking each number:




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
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
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


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**Step 3**

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**Step 2**

**Step 2 Thinking:**  
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if everyone is  
thinking about  
**Step 1**

**Step 1 Thinking:**  
These answers  
are impossible  
given the rules  
of the game

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Steps of thinking in the game are similar to steps of thinking about the market

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**Agent models** simulating the market should incorporate this **information asymmetry**

# Guess 2/3 of the average

A perfectly analytical investor should bet **0** or **1** — but this is not what usually wins the game. Usually, with a sufficiently large population of participants the winning guess is between **10** and **20**.

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- human **emotions and biases** associated with experiencing heavy losses,
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In the words of **Benjamin Graham** (author of the book „The Intelligent Investor“):


*„In the short term the market is a voting machine.*

*In the long term it's a weighing machine.”*

**Speculating**

# Returns on the FX market

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**83299** accounts of an online FX broker, 12 month data

curiousgnu.com


**79.5%** clients losing money. Over **5%** clients lost all or more than all of their equity.

**FX** is a **near-zero sum game**, so the gains of the remaining **20%** are relatively high

source: <http://www.couriousgnu.com>

# Investment styles

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


edited; original source:

<https://blogi.bossa.pl/2015/02/20/forexowi-milionerzy-mroczny-zakatek/>



# Investment styles



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# Investing

# Spotting the winners

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Source: FactSet, J.P. Morgan Asset Management.

source: „The Agony and the Ecstasy — the Risks and Rewards of a Concentrated Stock Position”, <http://read.jpmorgan.com/i/371035-eotm-special-edition/5>

A study encompassing **13 000 companies**, being part of the **Russell 3000** index at any time between **1980** and **2014** (34 years; small to medium sized companies).

The returns vs the index are shown above.

# Spotting the winners



Source: FactSet, J.P. Morgan Asset Management.

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About **40%** of assets experienced an at least **70%** drawdown, after which there was **no significant rebound**

Also around **40%** of the companies have in all **negative returns** during their whole existence on the market.

# Spotting the winners



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source: „The Agony and the Ecstasy — the Risks and Rewards of a Concentrated Stock Position”, <http://read.jpmorgan.com/i/371035-eotm-special-edition/5>

**66%** of the assets had returns **lower** than the index

**7%** had returns **much higher** than the index (500% higher than Russell 3000)

# Spotting the winners

It is similar for polish stock market data:

(source: <https://blogi.bossa.pl/2013/02/20/zwyciezcy-kreuja-stopy-zwrotu-z-rynku-akcyjnego/> )

# Spotting the winners


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Data from February **2009** (the market low) to February **2013** (**4 years**)

The market (WIG Index) rose **99%** in this time period.

Stock returns distribution:





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
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
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
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The individual stock contribution was:

Rate of change [ % ]	Number of stocks	% of stocks	Weighed contribution to the overall index performance
-99 to 0	150	43%	-21
0 to 100	94	27%	12
100 to 400	75	21%	41
>400	33	9%	67

source: <https://blogi.bossa.pl/2013/02/20/zwyciezcy-kreuja-stopu-zwrotu-z-rynku-akcyjnego/>

# Spotting the winners

When picking which stocks to invest in, it's hard to know which ones will gain value, but even harder to predict which will turn out to be the extreme winners

yet it is the the returns of these extreme winners that contribute most to the overall investor's return.

# Surviving drawdowns

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source:  
stooq.com



An extreme example is **Amazon** — one of the extreme winners, during its **20**-year existence on the exchange **multiplied** its market value more than **560** times.

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An extreme example is **Amazon** — one of the extreme winners, during its **20**-year existence on the exchange **multiplied** its market value more than **560** times.

From its inception, the stock experienced three, sometimes multi-year significant drawdowns:


- a drawdown of **95%** during the „dot-com bubble”: **1999-2001**
- a drawdown of **57%** between the years **2003-2006**
- a drawdown of **65%** during the late financial crisis of **2007-2008**



# Surviving volatility

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## Volatility Of United States Stocks



source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>

# A set of practical observations

about investing,  
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markets work

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JUST A NORMAL DAY AT THE NATION'S MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTION...



# A set of practical observations

about investing,  
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(part II)

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**Interesting general market effects**

# Sentiment analysis


# Sentiment analysis

When prices rise (investors gain), they become optimistic and **expect even higher prices**; vice versa when asset prices fall.

**Over-optimistic** and **over-pessimistic** levels are often (although not always) reported at important high and lows.

# Sentiment analysis



## WIG20 a indeks INI



sentiment data: SII Indeks Nastrojów Inwestorów, stock data: stooq.com





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
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sentiment data: AAll Sentiment Survey, index data: stooq.com

# Sentiment analysis

## United States Stock Market Sentiment



TheAtlasInvestor.com 

source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>


# Capital flows

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Another way of measuring investor expectations about future price movements is looking at aggregated **capital flows**.

# Capital flows

Exhibit 5: Global FMS average cash balance (%)




FMS = a regular, anonymous survey of hundreds of Fund Managers' cash and equity allocations, views and sentiment, made by Bank of America Merrill Lynch

source: <http://fat-pitch.blogspot.com>, BAML FMS

# Capital flows


## Global Fund Manager's Stock Market Exposure



source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>, BAML FMS

# Capital flows

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


edited, source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>, BAML FMS



# Capital flows

## Hedge Fund Positioning In Bonds




TheAtlasInvestor.com

source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>, CFTC COT report

# Capital flows


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
## Hedge Fund Positioning In The US Dollar



source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>, CFTC COT report

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
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
## Retail Investor's Cash Allocation



source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>

# Capital flows

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edited, source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>

# Value vs price

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When is a stock „expensive” and when is it „cheap” ?




# Value vs price

When is a stock „expensive” and when is it „cheap” ?

Among lots of fundamental measures, one of the most commonly used is **Price-to-Earnings ratio**.


For each company, sector or market the benchmark P/E value is different.

# Value vs price



# Value vs price

## Value to be found in most UK sectors




Source: Thomson Datastream, Schroders. Based on UK data from 31 December 1982 to 30 September 2016. Sectors shown are for illustrative purposes only and should not be viewed as a recommendation to buy or sell. The material is not intended to provide advice of any kind. Information herein is believed to be reliable but Schroders does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. RC60514

P/E of UK companies by sector, as of November 2016, source: <http://www.schroders.com/en/uk/private-investor/insights/markets/the-ftse-100-hits-all-time-high---but-can-it-go-higher/>

# Value vs price

We can also aggregate and speak of a P/E valuation of the broad stock market.

# Value vs price



edited; original source: <https://www.investing.com/analysis/is-bubble-risk-elevated-for-us-stocks-200175650>, CAPE Shiller Data

# Value vs price

Valuation Percentile	S&P 500 Average Forward Returns (Annualized, 1928 - 2016)									
	1-Yr	2-Yr	3-Yr	4-Year	5-Year	6-Year	7-Year	8-Year	9-Year	10-Year
0-10%	25.5%	20.1%	19.4%	19.6%	18.3%	16.9%	16.7%	16.4%	16.1%	15.6%
10-20%	19.2%	20.7%	17.5%	16.7%	15.9%	16.7%	16.7%	16.8%	16.5%	16.2%
20-30%	15.3%	16.7%	15.6%	15.6%	15.6%	14.4%	14.5%	14.8%	14.6%	14.8%
30-40%	15.5%	13.1%	13.1%	11.1%	12.0%	12.2%	12.1%	11.7%	12.3%	13.3%
40-50%	3.4%	6.1%	6.1%	7.6%	9.3%	10.4%	10.6%	10.3%	11.3%	11.8%
50-60%	6.4%	5.1%	6.9%	7.7%	8.4%	9.2%	9.5%	10.5%	10.8%	10.1%
60-70%	10.7%	11.2%	12.6%	13.1%	13.7%	13.5%	12.1%	10.7%	9.3%	8.6%
70-80%	6.2%	6.5%	7.6%	7.7%	7.4%	5.5%	5.4%	4.9%	5.0%	4.7%
80-90%	7.9%	8.6%	7.8%	7.8%	6.1%	4.8%	4.9%	5.9%	5.9%	6.3%
90-100%	3.0%	0.9%	0.5%	0.0%	0.1%	1.5%	2.6%	3.0%	3.0%	3.1%

Average S&P500 **forward returns** based on historical CAPE ratios

source: <https://pensionpartners.com/is-this-1929-or-1997/>

# Value vs price

Valuation Percentile	CAPE Ratio	S&P 500 Average Forward Volatility (1928 - 2016)									
		1-Yr	2-Yr	3-Yr	4-Year	5-Year	6-Year	7-Year	8-Year	9-Year	10-Year
0-10%	5.57 to 9.68	21.8%	20.2%	18.9%	18.4%	18.1%	18.5%	18.7%	18.7%	18.6%	18.3%
10-20%	9.69 to 11.22	15.1%	14.9%	15.6%	15.8%	15.9%	15.8%	15.6%	15.5%	15.2%	15.0%
20-30%	11.23 to 12.67	15.8%	15.7%	15.7%	16.3%	16.5%	16.3%	16.0%	15.6%	15.4%	15.2%
30-40%	12.68 to 14.98	15.8%	15.7%	15.7%	16.3%	16.5%	16.3%	16.0%	15.6%	15.4%	15.2%
40-50%	14.99 to 17.03	18.2%	18.2%	17.8%	17.3%	17.5%	16.9%	16.5%	16.1%	15.9%	15.8%
50-60%	17.04 to 18.84	14.8%	15.6%	16.3%	15.9%	15.4%	15.1%	15.1%	15.2%	15.1%	15.2%
60-70%	18.85 to 21.03	12.8%	13.7%	13.4%	13.7%	14.2%	14.9%	15.4%	15.7%	15.9%	15.8%
70-80%	21.03 to 22.21	14.0%	15.7%	16.7%	17.1%	17.7%	18.2%	18.7%	18.9%	18.9%	18.8%
80-90%	22.22 to 26.40	11.8%	13.4%	15.7%	17.4%	18.0%	18.3%	18.2%	17.7%	17.4%	17.5%
90-100%	26.41 to 44.20	17.1%	18.0%	18.8%	19.7%	19.5%	18.6%	18.0%	17.7%	17.7%	17.8%
All	All	16.2%	16.6%	16.9%	17.0%	17.0%	16.9%	16.8%	16.7%	16.6%	16.5%

Average S&P500 **forward volatility** based on historical CAPE ratios

source: <https://pensionpartners.com/is-this-1929-or-1997/>


# Value vs price

Other measures for the broad market include the summary **market capitalization** divided by the country's **GDP**.

These measures turn out to be quite similar.



# Value vs price




source: <https://www.valuwalk.com/2014/09/forecasting-equity-returns-cape-vs-market-cap-to-gdp/>

# Value vs price

One interesting observation is how closely these measures correlate to the **forward rolling stock market returns**.


# Value vs price



source: <http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc160328.htm>

# Value vs price


— Nonfinancial Corporate Equity / Nonfinancial Gross Value Added



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price


— Nonfinancial Gross Value Added / Nonfinancial Corporate Equity



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price


- Rolling forward 10-year SPX change
- Nonfinancial Gross Value Added / Nonfinancial Corporate Equity



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds


# Value vs price

- Rolling forward 10-year SPX change
- Hussman model
- Nonfinancial Gross Value Added / Nonfinancial Corporate Equity



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds


# Value vs price



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds



# Value vs price




source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price


Let's see **how accurate** would these projections be, if calculated on previous price data...

# Value vs price




source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price




source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price




source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price




source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds


# Value vs price



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds




# Value vs price




source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

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
source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

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
source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

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
source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price



source: Opoka TFI, Hussman Funds

# Value vs price

The **actual path** (pattern) of the stock market index was usually wrong, but the **general direction** (flat in the 60s and 70s, upwards in the 80s, flat in the first decade of 2000s) turned out correct.

The biggest discrepancy came in the 90s and in the recent decade (this still remains to be confirmed).

# Cycles and trends



# Cycles and trends

Financial markets exhibit **cyclical** characteristics.

# Cycles and trends


Financial markets exhibit **cyclical characteristics**.

There are also **trends**, prolonged relative outperformance periods of some assets or asset classes relative to others.

# Cycles and trends

FRED 

— Civilian Unemployment Rate



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
fred.stlouisfed.org

myf.red/g/4JN0


US Civilian Unemployment Rate

source: Federal Reserve Economic Data

# Cycles and trends


Published on TradingView.com, October 09, 2017 09:18 UTC

DJ:DJI, M 22773.67 ▼ -1.72 (-0.01%) O:22423.47 H:22777.04 L:22416.00 C:22773.67



# Cycles and trends


## Risk Assets Annualized Performance



Rolling 1-year rate of return of 5 main risk assets


source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>

# Cycles and trends



Rolling 1-year rate of return of SWIG80/WIG, source: Opoka TFI

# Cycles and trends



EUR/USD 1999-2017, DEM/USD before 1999, source: Opoka TFI

# Interdependence of asset classes



# Interdependence of asset classes

Investors often think of **different asset classes** (currencies, equities, commodities, bonds) as distinct and independent. In reality, the market is a complexly connected system, so even distinct asset classes might become **highly correlated** at times.

Sometimes this **interdependence** has a strong impact on investment outcomes, other times a portfolio of seemingly uncorrelated assets might be more risky than previously thought.

# Interdependence of asset classes




impact of the currency on returns, source: stooq.com

# Interdependence of asset classes



impact of the currency on returns, source: stooq.com

# Interdependence of asset classes



commodity index vs „commodity currencies”, source: stooq.com


# Passive vs Active investing

# Passive vs Active investing

Recently a passive „buy and hold a market index or an ETF” approach has gained high popularity

# Passive vs Active investing

## The Rise of the Benchmark




\*BLOOMBERG LP (WHICH OWNS BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK) AND ITS AFFILIATES PROVIDE INDEXES TRACKING VARIOUS ASSET CLASSES. DATA: BLOOMBERG INTELLIGENCE, SANFORD C. BERNSTEIN, WORLD BANK. CASH FLOWS AS OF MARCH 31; GRAPHIC BY BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK

source: bloomberg.com

# Passive vs Active investing

Chart 3: Passive smashing active




Note: based on EPFR Global's monthly dataset (more comprehensive coverage)

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Investment Strategy, EPFR Global



# Passive vs Active investing

**Exhibit 1: Passive investing accounts for nearly 40% of total US equity AUM, more than twice the level in 2005**  
AUM of US-domiciled equity mutual funds, index funds and ETFs; passive share of total AUM




Source: Strategic Insight, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

**Problem 1:**

# Passive vs Active investing

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AUM of US-domiciled equity mutual funds, index funds and ETFs; passive share of total AUM



Source: Strategic Insight, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.

**Problem 1: market concentration**

# Passive vs Active investing



source: stooq.com

**Problem 2:**


# Passive vs Active investing



source: stooq.com

**Problem 2: surviving drawdowns**

# Passive vs Active investing



\* Active Large Blend is made up of funds from the Morningstar Large Blend category that are not index or enhanced index funds.

\* S&P 500 Index Funds is represented by the Morningstar S&P 500 Tracking Category.

source: Morningstar, Hartford Funds

# Passive vs Active investing

**More market concentration** = higher risk of flash crash events,  
similar to the **1987** market crash

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Sudden rise of popularity of ETFs in recent years (during an 8 year bull-market) means a lot of these new investors **did not experience a severe drawdown yet**

It is **surviving drawdowns** and not turning away from the investment in these **crucial times that is essential for the success of passive investing** (or for any successful investment strategy)

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It is **surviving drawdowns** and not turning away from the investment in these **crucial times that is essential for the success of passive investing** (or for any successful investment strategy)

In general, passive investing is a sensible approach for a long term investor not interested in above-average investment returns

Passive usually outperforms active as more mature a bull market becomes


Still, the only way to achieve higher than average returns or better **risk/return** ratios is an active investment approach



# Current state of the stock market

# Current state of the stock market

## Relative Strength Of Global Stock Regions



relative performance of markets around the world, source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>

# Current state of the stock market

## Global Stock Market Year To Date Performance

Country	ETF	YTD %	Country	ETF	YTD %	Country	ETF	YTD %
Poland	EPOL	51.4%	Italy	EWI	26.6%	Australia	EWA	15.2%
Turkey	TUR	45.2%	South Korea	EWY	26.6%	United Kingdom	EWU	14.0%
Austria	EWO	42.4%	Nigeria	NGE	24.9%	Vietnam	VNM	13.7%
Argentina	ARGT	31.5%	France	EWQ	24.4%	Indonesia	EIDO	13.1%
India	INP	31.0%	Sweden	EWD	24.3%	Japan	EWJ	12.5%
Chile	ECH	30.4%	Singapore	EWS	23.6%	The Philippines	EPHE	12.1%
Greece	GREK	30.2%	Belgium	EWK	22.3%	United States	SPY	11.3%
Netherlands	EWN	29.8%	United States (Tech)	QQQ	22.3%	United Arab Emirates	UAE	10.8%
Hong Kong	EWH	29.0%	Germany	EWG	21.6%	Canada	EWC	9.0%
Portugal	PGAL	28.6%	China (Shenzhen)	CNXT	21.4%	Israel	EIS	5.6%
Mexico	EWX	28.4%	Ireland	EIRL	20.9%	Saudi Arabia	KSA	5.3%
Taiwan	EWT	27.5%	Switzerland	EWL	20.2%	Egypt	EGPT	4.9%
China (Shanghai)	ASHR	27.3%	Norway	ENOR	18.9%	United States (Real Estate)	VNQ	4.7%
Spain	EWP	27.1%	South Africa	EZA	18.7%	United States (Small Caps)	IWM	4.0%
Brazil	EWZ	26.8%	Thailand	THD	18.4%	Russia	RSX	1.9%
China (Hong Kong)	FXI	26.7%	Malaysia	EWM	17.6%	Qatar	QAT	-12.8%
			Colombia	GXG	15.8%	Pakistan	PAK	-18.2%

TheAtlasInvestor.com




as of September 2017, all results based on ETFs denominated in USD

relative performance of markets around the world, source: <http://TheAtlasInvestor.com>


# Current state of the stock market

## Retail Investor's Cash Allocation




low cash allocations, but could be lower still

# Current state of the stock market




record low volatility; own work, updated at <http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~glink/sejsmograf/>

# Current state of the stock market



second longest bull market... but it's still far below the highest reaching

# Current state of the stock market



**Will this projection turn out correct?** Probably not, nonetheless it's a reasonable guide so we should be prepared for weaker index performance in the upcoming years

# Summary



# Summary

Due to the complex nature of markets and their participants, there exist **mispricings** and **regularities** in price behaviors than can be studied deeper.

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Among these are investor **sentiment** dynamics, **capital flows**, the **cyclical** and **trending** of markets and **interdependence** of asset classes

# Summary

Due to the complex nature of markets and their participants, there exist **mispricings** and **regularities** in price behaviors than can be studied deeper.

Among these are investor **sentiment** dynamics, **capital flows**, the **cyclicality** and **trending** of markets and **interdependence** of asset classes

Financial markets are part stochastic, part deterministic. It's hard to predict the outcome of a single investment, but it's possible to **outperform** it the long run.

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A great source of interesting market research is the blogger **Trystero** of bossa.pl, i.e.: <https://blogi.bossa.pl/2015/09/14/kilka-procent-zwyciezcow-i-23-przegranych/>

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TheCyclicalNatureofActiveandPassiveInvesting.html](https://www.hartfordfunds.com/insights/featured-perspectives/TheCyclicalNatureofActiveandPassiveInvesting.html)

A comparison of CAPE and market cap / GDP measures:  
<https://www.valuwalk.com/2014/09/forecasting-equity-returns-cape-vs-market-cap-to-gdp/>

John Hussman's projections:  
<https://www.hussmanfunds.com>; <http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc160328.htm>

...and a critique of the Hussman approach:  
<http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2014/06/critique/>

Benjamin Graham, „*The Intelligent Investor*“, a rich source of sound investment rules and observations.

# References

Thank you for your attention!

# References

Thank you for your attention!

And please remember: none of this is investment advice.  
Investors invest at their own risk. All works cited are  
copyrighted to their respective owners and sources.